Gov NANCE
By Paul r. osBorne, cPa, cPo, aMlP, and JeFFrey a. Jones, caMs
Transaction Monitoring: Where to Start?
Cconsider THe Follo Wing: your bank examiner or bank management has strongly recommended that you purchase an automated system
to monitor your customer transactions for suspicious money-laundering
activity. you’re thinking now that all of your institution’s problems will be
solved. However, these systems are complicated and are often designed
to be tailored to the specific customer behavior of each bank. More than
just a set of reports, they usually filter activity against a set of rules that
the bank determines. authors Paul osborne and Jeffrey Jones discuss
where to start when it comes to monitoring customer transactions for
money-laundering activity.
Start With Risk Assessment
As with any other part of a Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti–money
laundering (AML) program, a risk
assessment is the starting point. The
Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) examination
manual states, “The level of monitoring should be dictated by the bank’s
assessment of risk, with particular emphasis on high-risk products, services,
customers, entities, and geographic
locations.” A transaction monitoring
1
and divides customers into business
and personal accounts. Is this enough?
The answer is probably no.
As the FFIEC guidelines indicate,
“The type and frequency of reviews
and resulting reports used should be
commensurate with the bank’s BSA/
AML risk profile and appropriately
cover its high-risk products, services,
customers, entities, and geographic
locations.” 2 At a minimum, this means
adding monitoring for frequent and
high-dollar transactions, significant
balance changes, spikes in activity, and
transactions with common originators and beneficiaries. Anything that
is out of the ordinary for a particular
customer peer group should be looked
at more closely. Unusual behavior generally leads to investigating further
transactions that are not consistent
with the stated business purpose or occupation or with the source of income
or geographic location in which the
customer operates.
and automated clearing house (ACH)
transactions that were once used for
smaller, low-risk, recurring amounts—
have also been classified as high-risk
because they move money quickly, in
large amounts, and often with hidden
identities and worldwide geographic
locations.
In order to conduct a more comprehensive investigation, less-risky
transactions like checks and customer-initiated transfers between accounts
are also important and should be
monitored to develop a foundation
and general understanding of a customer’s typical transaction behavior.
Historical or typical behavior is
important to determine because it acts
as a benchmark for setting thresholds
for flagging transactions and plays a
key role in minimizing the number of
false-positive alerts that are generated
by broad-based rules not centered on
actual risk characteristics.
system might already come with a set
of default rules that are typical of money-laundering activities and generally
common to all banks. These would
include cash structuring, transaction
layering, “smurfing,” and round dollar
amounts. Typically, this basic monitoring focuses on cash and wire activity
Look at All Risks
Depending on the results of the risk
assessment, monitoring should include transaction activities other than
cash, wires, and monetary instruments. Recently, electronically conducted transactions—including ATM
Timing Is a Factor
Suspicious activity can be the result of
a one-time occurrence or a series of
transactions occurring over a period of
time that establish a pattern of unusual
or unexplainable behavior. Rules that
detect a variety of transaction types
and multiple timing schemes need to
be established. Some rules should look
at customer behavior in time periods
of less than one week; others should
look at daily activity. And still other
rules should yield no results until longer periods of time have elapsed and
patterns have been established.
To avoid bank reporting or record-keeping requirements, fraudulent
transactions often are split up over
time, which is referred to as structur-